Why is DMO hoarding Public Debt data?
admin
“Why are they hoarding data?” is not a question any debt management office should invite, yet that is precisely where we are as Nigeria waits for public debt figures that should already be in circulation.
The Debt Management Office has not released Nigeria’s public debt data as of September 2025, even though, by its established publication pattern, those figures ought to have appeared around December 2025, typically before the Christmas break and certainly before year-end when analysts tidy up their annual models.
December came and went with festive optimism, January followed with reform-season speeches and investor briefings, and we now sit in mid-February still refreshing the website.
The delay is roughly three months beyond the expected cycle, which in ordinary bureaucratic life may seem trivial but in capital markets feels conspicuous and invites interpretation.
Silence in public finance rarely functions as a neutral placeholder, because investors tend to treat missing data not as an administrative hiccup but as a potential signal.
Historically, the DMO has maintained a fairly dependable rhythm that allowed the market to plan around it with confidence and precision.
March data typically arrives in June, June numbers surface in September, and September figures are released in December, thereby creating a predictable cadence that analysts build into debt sustainability frameworks and refinancing projections.
That rhythm matters because Nigeria’s debt profile is not a peripheral statistic tucked into an appendix, but the backbone of conversations about fiscal sustainability, refinancing risk, and macroeconomic resilience.
Without the September 2025 data, several critical questions remain suspended in uncertainty.
Has total public debt crossed another symbolic threshold that will shape headline narratives?
What is the updated split between domestic and external obligations, particularly in a year defined by exchange-rate volatility?
How much of any increase reflects fresh borrowing decisions, and how much is the mechanical consequence of currency depreciation repricing existing external debt?
Where does the debt-to-GDP trajectory now stand following GDP rebasing and fiscal adjustments? Has the debt-service-to-revenue ratio eased, stabilised, or tightened its grip?
In a high interest rate environment with persistent exchange-rate pressure, these are not academic exercises for conference panels but live variables in risk-pricing models and portfolio allocation decisions.
The September numbers would capture the cumulative impact of domestic issuances across 2025, incorporate any multilateral disbursements or Eurobond activity, and reveal whether subnational borrowing trends are accelerating or stabilising.
They would also clarify developments around Ways and Means conversions or securitisation adjustments, which remain central to understanding the true structure of public liabilities.
Nigeria’s debt dynamics are especially sensitive to currency movements because external obligations, when translated into naira, can swell dramatically without a single additional dollar being borrowed.
If the naira weakened further between June and September, the nominal debt stock could have risen sharply even if fiscal authorities exercised restraint on new external issuance.
Markets draw a careful distinction between structural fiscal expansion and valuation-driven increases, since one suggests policy loosening while the other reflects exchange-rate mechanics that may be temporary or cyclical.
This is why transparency operates not merely as a governance virtue but as a market instrument.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu recently argued that credible financial institutions, including any prospective African credit rating agency, must anchor their assessments in timely and comprehensive data that global capital can trust.
He pointed to improvements in Nigeria’s statistical breadth, the formal recognition of previously off-balance-sheet central bank lending within the public debt register, GDP rebasing to reflect economic reality more accurately, and expanded budget disclosures as factors supporting recent credit upgrades.
That reform narrative rests heavily on consistency, because markets reward clarity and penalise ambiguity with remarkable efficiency.
Nigeria is attempting to rebuild investor confidence after painful macroeconomic adjustments that included exchange rate reforms, fuel subsidy removal, and sustained monetary tightening, all of which required political capital and imposed short-term discomfort.
The credibility of those reforms depends not only on policy direction but on the reliability of the data that documents their effects.
Investors do not merely glance at fiscal deficits and move on, since they interrogate debt trajectories, maturity structures, refinancing concentrations, currency composition, and interest cost trends before assigning risk premiums.
When a reporting cycle breaks without explanation, speculation fills the vacuum quickly and often uncharitably, particularly in emerging markets where historical memory can be long.
There is no evidence that anything is being concealed, and it is entirely plausible that reconciliation complexities are at play, given the coordination required among the Federal Government, 36 state governments, the Federal Capital Territory, multilateral lenders, and domestic markets.
Debt reporting involves verification, consolidation, and sometimes methodological upgrades that can slow publication timelines, especially when data integrity is prioritised over speed.
However, communication is part of transparency, and a brief statement outlining the reason for the delay or providing a revised publication timeline would significantly reduce conjecture.
In contemporary capital markets, process discipline often carries as much reputational weight as the figures themselves, because predictability signals institutional strength.
If the September 2025 numbers demonstrate stability, their release would reinforce the reform story and underscore fiscal management discipline.
If they show an uptick driven largely by exchange-rate valuation effects, markets could absorb that outcome as well, provided the context is explained clearly and consistently. What investors struggle to price is not adverse data but uncertainty prolonged without narrative framing.
Nigeria’s fiscal position already attracts scrutiny, since debt servicing absorbs a substantial share of federal revenue while subnational finances remain uneven and external financing conditions stay tight.
In that environment, delayed reporting naturally provokes questions about whether debt has accelerated faster than anticipated, whether borrowing costs have climbed materially, or whether pressure is building beneath the surface.
Even if the answer to each of those concerns is reassuring, the absence of data amplifies doubt and complicates the reform message.
The Debt Management Office has historically cultivated a reputation for structured and relatively consistent reporting, and preserving that credibility should remain an institutional priority rather than an afterthought.
Trust compounds much like interest, accumulating gradually through disciplined transparency and eroding quietly when information flows slowly without explanation.
When analysts, investors, and citizens begin to ask what might be hidden, the bigger risk is not necessarily the headline debt figure but the subtle deterioration of confidence that reform efforts depend upon.
In sovereign finance, confidence is a currency that requires constant reinforcement, and timely data release remains one of its most reliable instruments.
